Undersea Sensors: A U.S. Trump Card That China Knows it Must Eliminate
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[By David Axe]<\/em><\/p>\n Unseen, largely unknown and, until recently, highly classified, the US Navy\u2019s vast network of underwater sonars is one of its greatest advantages over rival fleets. The United States can detect many, if not most, enemy submarines through much of the world\u2019s oceans.<\/p>\n A sub that can be detected can also be killed. It\u2019s a profound problem for the Chinese navy as it eyes a possible amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait. Its growing fleet of quiet attack submarines could protect the landing force\u2014but only if they themselves can avoid detection.<\/p>\n The problem for the US is that the Chinese fully appreciate how vulnerable they are underwater\u2014and they\u2019re actively thinking about ways to end that vulnerability. The US fleet needs new and better ways of defending its underwater sensors during a seabed battle that could get very nasty, very quickly in the months and weeks leading up to a possible Chinese move against Taiwan.<\/p>\n In particular, the US needs more ships that can repair the sensor network at sea. \u2018There are only a small handful of vessels capable of such at-sea repairs, fewer than 10 globally, and they are easy targets when on station,\u2019 warned Chris O\u2019Flaherty, a retired Royal Navy captain with deep experience in undersea warfare.<\/p>\n The US Navy was a pioneer in seabed surveillance. In 1950, the service launched the then highly secret Project Jezebel, a generational effort to lay thousands of miles of undersea cable connecting sensitive acoustic sensors to shore stations staffed by sonar analysts.<\/p>\n By the time the navy declassified the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System in 1991, it also included catamaran surveillance ships towing additional acoustic arrays. Today, the system\u2014again largely cloaked in secrecy\u2014probably also features many small drones on the surface and under the waves. Shore sensors, ocean surveillance satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, crewed and uncrewed, also complement the undersea equipment.<\/p>\n It\u2019s not a totally global, totally comprehensive surveillance system\u2014but it\u2019s close. And it vexes naval planners of the People\u2019s Republic of China. \u2018The probability that PRC submarines are discovered when leaving port is extremely high,\u2019 Senior Captain Zhang Ning, a faculty member at China\u2019s Naval University of Engineering, wrote along with coauthors in a November 2023 journal article translated by Ryan Martinson, a professor at the US Naval War College.<\/p>\n \u2018There is a fairly high probability that PRC submarines will be detected and intercepted while operating in the Near Seas\u2019 along the First Island Chain between Philippines and Japan, Zhang and his coauthors warned, according to Martinson. Cued by surveillance, US and allied anti-submarine forces\u2014submarines, ships and aircraft\u2014can cut off Chinese attack boats from the deep water where they could best perform their missions.<\/p>\n But the US surveillance system isn\u2019t invulnerable, Zhang and his coauthors stressed. \u2018The authors further argue that the location of individual \u201cnodes\u201d \u2026 in the U.S. undersea surveillance system can be located and \u201cremoved\u201d,\u2019 Martinson wrote in an analysis of Zhang and company\u2019s own analysis,\u00a0published by\u00a0the Center for International Maritime Security.<\/p>\n O\u2019Flaherty listed the ways Chinese forces could disable US undersea sensors. They ranged from the \u2018relatively overt\u2019\u2014the deployment of remotely operated vehicles from unhidden surface motherships \u2018to go down to almost any depth and to uncover and sever cables\u2019\u2014to \u2018semi-covert\u2019 methods. One semi-covert method would be sending autonomous submarines equipped with sonars to find the cables and plant explosive charges to cut them.<\/p>\n The Chinese may want to undertake a covert counter-cable effort far in advance of any attempt to invade Taiwan. Long-range underwater vehicles could \u2018leave an explosive charge in the immediate vicinity of a cable, ready for actuation at a time of the owner\u2019s choosing\u2014which could be years hence,\u2019 O\u2019Flaherty said. \u2018Actuation of such an explosive can be via a coded acoustic signal, which is very easy to achieve.\u2019<\/p>\n Cables can be repaired, of course\u2014usually by highly trained crew aboard specialized auxiliary vessels. The US Navy operates just one cable-repair ship, the 14,600-ton USNS\u00a0Zeus, delivered to US Military Sealift Command in 1984. For several years now, the navy has been studying a possible replacement for the aging\u00a0Zeus, but the service is still years away from signing a contract and cutting steel.<\/p>\n And anyway, there\u2019s no way\u00a0Zeus\u00a0and its crew could perform their hard, precise work in contested waters during wartime. As O\u2019Flaherty said, cable ships are \u2018easy targets\u2019.<\/p>\n It\u2019s possible the US fleet\u2019s single special-mission submarine\u2014the heavily modified, 12,000-ton USS\u00a0Jimmy Carter\u2014could covertly deploy divers for select cable repairs. After all, finding, tapping and eavesdropping on the enemy\u2019s cables is reportedly among the boat\u2019s secret missions.<\/p>\n Even with\u00a0Jimmy Carter\u00a0on cable duty, the US Navy would be stretched thin trying to safeguard the surveillance system that lends it one of its greatest advantages in wartime. And forget hiring private companies to help. Even if they were willing to risk ships during open conflict, there\u2019s a global shortage of commercial cable vessels. Fewer than 10 are in use, but one trade group\u00a0claimed the world needs 20.<\/p>\n The US fleet still spends most of its nearly $40 billion annual shipbuilding budget on aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, destroyers, logistics ships and submarines. It had better start prioritizing cable vessels, too\u2014and figure out how to protect them after the shooting starts.<\/p>\n David Axe\u00a0is a journalist and filmmaker in South Carolina, United States.<\/em><\/p>\n This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here<\/a>.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \t
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