China’s Opening Salvo Against Taiwan Will Likely Be a Partial Blockade
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[By\u00a0Jane Rickards]<\/em><\/p>\n The West had better think carefully about how it would handle China imposing a nominally civil quarantine on Taiwan, because that\u2019s the tactic that increasingly looks like an opening move for Beijing in taking control of the island.<\/p>\n A quarantine, imposing limited controls on access to the island, offered strong advantages for China even before Taiwan said in October that a blockade, surrounding it with forces to cut off all access, would be an act of war. Taiwan\u2019s statement means China is even more likely to choose\u00a0quarantine\u00a0as a first step.<\/p>\n This use of the word \u2018quarantine\u2019 was coined in an important Center for Strategic and International Studies\u00a0report\u00a0last year. The authors foresaw that the Chinese government might ban only certain types of goods from entering Taiwan, or it could forbid ships from using a certain port. The measures would be enforced by nominally non-military forces, such as the China Coastguard.<\/p>\n Conceivably, China could see whether it could get away once with a\u00a0quarantine\u00a0action, then, noting success in asserting its authority, do it again and gradually tighten restrictions until they turned into a blockade\u2014salami slicing, as it does in so many areas of international affairs.<\/p>\n First among the inherent advantages of\u00a0quarantine\u00a0for Beijing is that, unlike more warlike action, it brings no commitment to go all the way, to conquer or be defeated. It would raise no great expectation among the highly nationalist Chinese people of imminent conquest of Taiwan. So if the measure met stiff resistance, the Chinese Communist Party could back away from it, declaring that some civil administrative objective had been achieved.<\/p>\n Yet forcing it to back down would be difficult for Taiwan and its friends, which is another advantage of the\u00a0quarantine\u00a0tactic. They would have to escalate with warships and possibly armed force to stop a China Coast Guard ship from intercepting a freighter, for example. This would put Taiwan and the West in the unfortunate position of looking like the initiators of military conflict. On the other hand,\u00a0if Taiwan and the West did nothing, and intimidated shipping companies mostly went along with the quarantine, China\u2019s narrative that it had control over Taiwan would be strengthened.<\/p>\n Taiwanese Minister of National Defence Wellington Koo said in October that\u00a0Taiwan would consider a blockade an act of war and would respond on a war footing after massive Chinese military drills were held near the island.<\/p>\n A\u00a0quarantine\u00a0would probably cause little or no disruption to China\u2019s own trade, whereas the risk of military confrontation in a blockade could frighten ship owners into avoiding the Taiwan Strait and Chinese ports near it. This would\u00a0severely\u00a0affect China\u2019s economy: most shipments that pass through the Taiwan Strait are Chinese imports and exports.<\/p>\n A quarantine would probably involve no dramatic announcements from Beijing. Instead, China could claim it merely needed to expand customs procedures in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters where\u00a0China believes it has jurisdiction. This might involve the Chinese coast guard carrying out inspections of ships and boarding non-Chinese vessels to inspect their paperwork. Vessels that refuse to comply could be forced to turn back or even be hit with water cannons. The coast guard could then restrict vital imports that enter Taiwan, such as energy products. This could cripple the Taiwanese economy and have the effect of shattering the Taiwanese people\u2019s morale and willingness to resist Beijing.<\/p>\n Throughout 2024, China\u2019s coast guard increased intrusive patrols in waters around Taiwan\u2019s outlying Kinmen archipelago, which is close to China.<\/p>\n In a possible early sign of a quarantine tactic, China\u2019s coast guard in February 2024 intercepted a Taiwanese sight-seeing ferry that was sailing around Kinmen\u2019s main island during a period when cross-strait tensions were running high. Chinese coast guard officers boarded the Taiwanese boat and asked to inspect the documentation of the crew, before disembarking a while later. Then, in mid-May, the Chinese state media outlet\u00a0China Daily\u00a0said, \u2018In the future, this \u2018Kinmen model\u2019 of law enforcement inspections can also be applied to Matsu and Penghu islands, and even the entire Taiwan Strait.\u2019<\/p>\n Among the difficult options for Taiwanese and Western response might be beefing up of Taiwan\u2019s own coast guard, which is vastly smaller than China\u2019s,\u00a0and training it to respond to such tactics.<\/p>\n The US could also impose financial sanctions on China if it imposed a quarantine and persuade other democracies to join in. In doing so, the West would be hitting back at China using tactics that, like China\u2019s quarantine, fall short of war. This might also meet the incoming Trump administration\u2019s goal of weakening China, which it views as an economic competitor.<\/p>\n Whatever the response will be, plans are needed. Quarantine is so attractive a measure for China that Taiwan and its friends must be prepared.<\/p>\n Jane Rickards, a journalist and frequent contributor to\u00a0The Economist, has lived in Taiwan since 2004.<\/em><\/p>\n This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here<\/a>.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \t
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