Meta’s Waterworth Subsea Cable is About Geopolitics and Geoeconomics
\n \t
\n
<\/BR>
\n
\n \t
\n
<\/BR><\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
[By Ravi Nayyar]<\/em><\/p>\n Announced\u00a0on 14 February, Meta\u2019s Project Waterworth is not just proposed to be the world\u2019s longest submarine cable but reflects ever-shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic landscapes. It presents a great opportunity for Australia to collaborate more with its regional partners, especially India and the Pacific countries, on technologies keeping us online.<\/p>\n For Meta, this addition to subsea infrastructure is slated to open a chance to monetize\u00a0accelerating\u00a0international data flows. In developing and running this cable, Meta also seeks to prioritise its own traffic and minimise latency for its and its partners\u2019 infrastructure and services. No surprises there.<\/p>\n But what is different this time is the clear recognition of intense geostrategic competition featuring both state and non-state actors. Connecting five continents, the proposed route, longer than the circumference of the planet, avoids areas subject to malign influence or control, such as the Baltic, Red and South China seas. Meta plans to lay as much of the cable as possible in deep water, making it harder for malicious actors to spy on or sabotage it.<\/p>\n Perhaps an even bigger takeaway is Meta\u2019s choice of locations for cable landing points: the coastlines of three BRICS countries (India, South Africa and Brazil) and three\u00a0Quad\u00a0countries (India, Australia and the United States). With India\u00a0being\u00a0in both groupings, the route particularly reflects India\u2019s rise as a\u00a0digital,\u00a0geopolitical\u00a0and\u00a0economic\u00a0power. Meta has specifically said the cable will support India\u2019s continued rise in the digital realm. With the world\u2019s largest population, India is both a massive source of data to train Meta\u2019s AI products and an\u00a0emerging hub\u00a0for data centres.<\/p>\n More broadly, Meta is seeking to be a bigger player in the submarine cable industry, and thus in geopolitics,\u00a0competing with\u00a0fellow US hyperscalers Google, Microsoft and Amazon. Indeed, those three companies and Meta\u00a0represent\u00a0about three quarters of active submarine cable capacity worldwide. Meta seeks to\u00a0go\u00a0one better by, as it said, \u2018opening three new oceanic corridors\u2019 with Project Waterworth.<\/p>\n Meta knows how the geostrategic significance of submarine cables is causing the technology\u2019s politicisation, reflecting an ongoing split between the anti-China and pro-China camps in telecommunications amid the larger Sino-US technological rivalry.<\/p>\n As a US technology company, Meta arguably seeks to reinforce its value as a member of the anti-China camp, alongside Google, Microsoft and Amazon. It would see Project Waterworth as a downpayment on support from Western and partner governments (such as finance, easier regulatory approvals and oversight, and more robust diplomatic and operational support) to help counter Chinese influence in digital infrastructure, especially in the Global South.<\/p>\n In this context, Meta must beware cyber supply-chain risks that can arise from its and its operating partners using: Chinese equipment at any point in the technology stack; and unvetted\u00a0remote access applications, managed security service providers and managed network service providers.<\/p>\n Rising cyber threats around telecommunications infrastructure underline the importance of such cyber supply chain risk management. In 2022, cybercriminals attacked the servers of the operator of a submarine cable that connected Hawaii with the Pacific. Chinese state-sponsored hackers have compromised US terrestrial telecommunications infrastructure for\u00a0espionage\u00a0and\u00a0pre-positioning\u00a0malicious capabilities\u00a0to be deployed during a major security crisis (such as a Taiwan contingency).<\/p>\n Indeed, such are the risks to submarine cables that the US \u00a0Federal Communications Commission has\u00a0proposed\u00a0reforms to its regulatory regime. These changes relate to: cyber risk management by operators; banning certain hardware or software from regulated cables and their infrastructure; risks from remote access solutions; and cable operators reporting their use of managed network service providers.<\/p>\n While Project Waterworth may seem like just another planned cable by another Big Tech company, Australia should be paying attention because a cable landing point in northern Australia has been proposed. Meta\u2019s plan reinforces the\u00a0extraordinary\u00a0significance\u00a0of the\u00a0maritime domain\u00a0for Australia, with\u00a0more than a dozen\u00a0submarine cables already\u00a0connecting\u00a0us with the world via the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India\u2019s role as a landing site is also important as Australia seeks to continue boosting economic and technology ties with New Delhi.<\/p>\n Project Waterworth also allows for further cyber diplomacy with Pacific partners. The project could bolster Pacific connectivity and cyber resilience through branches to Pacific countries, complementing Google\u2019s efforts through the\u00a0Pacific Connect Initiative.<\/p>\n The project further offers Australia the opportunity to work with regional partners to tackle\u00a0regulatory fragmentation\u00a0and\u00a0boost operational collaboration\u00a0on submarine cables. For example, the Australian Communications and Media Authority should engage regional counterparts to identify opportunities to harmonise and expand regulatory regimes, such as for\u00a0cable repair\u00a0and by mandating transparency from operators around cable damage (as ASPI\u2019s Jocelinn Kang and Jessie Jacob\u00a0have recommended). Canberra should work with regional partners to also increase information-sharing on risks around cables traversing exclusive economic zones. The Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade could help mediate such engagement, while the Australian Cyber Security Centre and Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre could provide expert advice to inform policy on the operational resilience of submarine cable infrastructure<\/p>\n Project Waterworth reflects our brave new world, especially its contested digital and maritime domains, and the opportunity for Australia to collaborate further with regional partners to keep us all online.<\/p>\n Ravi Nayyar\u00a0is a fellow and research contributor at ASPI, associate fellow at the Social Cyber Institute, and a PhD Scholar at the University of Sydney. This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here<\/a>.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \t
\n
<\/BR><\/p>\n