\u00a0<\/p>\n
[By Bruce Stubbs]<\/em><\/p>\n \u201cA requirement is a requirement, pure and simple.\u201d \u201cOne man\u2019s requirement is like another man\u2019s wish.\u201d A Team of Rivals<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The United States Marine Corps has an outsized effect on Navy force planning. While the Navy and the Marines exhibit a sincere and genuine single team spirit conducting global naval operations, they are a fierce team of rivals when determining the requirements for amphibious ships (also known as \u201camphibs\u201d), which the Navy funds for their construction and operation.<\/p>\n Soon after becoming Marine Corps Commandant, General David H. Berger announced a headline-grabbing transformation of the Corps in his July 2019\u00a0Commandant\u2019s Planning Guidance.\u00a0In its new role, the Marines would operate inside actively contested maritime spaces to conduct sea denial and assured access missions with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific theater. In March 2020 Berger further explained his concept in\u00a0Force Design 2030. Berger\u2019s guidance declared that the Navy\u2019s large amphibs were too vulnerable and too expensive to risk in combat, the Marines\u2019 requirement for 38 or 34 large amphibs was no longer valid, and the Marines had a new requirement for small, agile amphibs.<\/p>\n His unprecedented, if not historic, transformational initiative sparked a yearslong controversy over two inter-related issues. First,\u00a0Force Design 2030\u00a0punctured the Corps\u2019 rationale for Navy\u2019s large amphibs, which the two sea services refer to as either\u00a0\u201cbig deck\u201d or \u201csmall deck\u201d\u00a0ships. Second, the initiative handed the Navy a multi-billion dollar bill to construct and operate a new class of amphibs designated eventually as the\u00a0Medium Landing Ship.\u00a0<\/p>\n Issue#1: Number of Large Amphibious Ships<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Shifting Requirements<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n From Berger\u2019s determination that large amphibs were too vulnerable and too expensive, it logically followed what Mark Cancian, an analyst at the Center for Security and International Studies and a retired colonel of Marines, concluded. If the Marines believed their \u201cfuture lay in small amphibious ships, then the Pentagon should limit the building of\u00a0large amphibious ships.\u201d\u00a0The Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office\u2014a powerful analytical office reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense\u2014took notice of this contradiction in the Marines\u2019 transformation planning.<\/p>\n Since the end of the Cold War, the Marines\u2019 requirement for large amphibs has been an issue for the Navy.\u00a0Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates\u00a0(2006-2011) in May 2010 explained why: \u201cWe have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again \u2013 especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore.\u2026 what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?\u201d<\/p>\n Echoing Gates\u2019 arguments, Jerry Hendrix, a senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute and a retired Navy captain, stated that the Marine Corps has \u201cbeen less than convincing on the role of amphibs in the future fight\u201d and the need for joint forcible entry and amphibious assault.\u00a0He observed, \u201d \u2026 outside of beaches on the Korean Peninsula \u2026 where [are they] going to be doing amphibious assault \u2026\u00a0what [is] the argument\u201d for this capability? According to\u00a0Cancian, the Marines have not \u201coffered a strong wartime rationale for 31 large amphibious ships.\u201d<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s Defense Secretary Wants Fewer Large Amphibious Ships<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n By early 2020, it appeared Secretary of Defense Mark Esper had determined that the requirement for opposed amphibious landings was diminishing. He wanted a warfighting strategy to drive amphibious force planning, not a peacetime forward presence strategy. So, Esper directed his staff to conduct a new amphib study as a component of a larger study on the Navy\u2019s total ship requirements. Completed in October 2020, the\u00a0Future Navy Force Study\u00a0served as the basis for the first Trump administration\u2019s last Navy\u00a0shipbuilding plan,\u00a0submitted to Congress in December 2020. Esper\u2019s unprecedented tasking of his staff to conduct this study resulted in the Navy losing control over its force planning efforts for\u00a0about eight months.<\/p>\n This plan had dire consequences for the Marines. It reduced the number of large amphibs by calling for a range of 9 to 10 \u201cbig deck\u201d ships and a range of 52 to 57 for\u00a0all other amphibs.\u00a0Ronald O\u2019Rourke, the respected Congressional Research Service analyst, suggested that this range could be divided into 19 or fewer \u201csmall deck\u201d ships and 28 to 30 of the new Light Amphibious Warship. The combined total of \u201cbig deck\u201d and \u201csmall deck\u201d ships would be well under 30, which was unacceptable to the Marines.\u00a0<\/p>\n Biden\u2019s Navy Secretary Also Wanted Fewer Large Amphibious Ships and Another Study<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n On June 17, 2021, new Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro released the\u00a0fiscal year 2022 shipbuilding plan. It called for 8 to 9 \u201cbig deck\u201d amphibs, 16 to 19 \u201csmall deck\u201d amphibs, and 24 to 35 new\u00a0Light Amphibious Warships,\u00a0which in 2024 the Navy redesignated the Medium Landing Ship. Also in June, the Navy and the Marines completed another amphib study which determined a\u00a0requirement for 28 to 31 large\u00a0amphibs. For the Marines, \u201c31-amphibs\u201d became their red-line for large amphibs, contradicting the Secretary\u2019s range of 24 to 29 in the fiscal year 2022 shipbuilding plan.<\/p>\n In September 2021 Del Toro directed another evaluation of amphibious ship requirements called the\u00a0Amphibious Force Requirement Study\u00a0for delivery by March 2022. (Del Toro delayed submitting this study to Congress until December 2022.) By February 2022, Admiral Michael Gilday, the Chief of Naval Operations, publicly stated that the fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan would include, \u201cprobably nine big deck amphibs and another 19 or 20 [\u201csmall deck\u201d ships]\u00a0to support them.\u201d Gilday\u2019s numbers indicated a range of 28 to 29 for the large amphibs. A few months later, Del Toro released the\u00a0fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan\u00a0in April, presenting an unhelpful package of\u00a0three alternative plans\u00a0for a range of 7 to 9 \u201cbig deck\u201d ships and 15 to 26 \u201csmall deck\u201d ships for a total between 22 to 26 by fiscal year 2045. The reduction in large amphibs would prevent the Marines from simultaneously deploying three Marine Expeditionary Units.<\/p>\n While the Biden administration signaled it did not fully support the Marines\u2019 requirements, some in Congress did. Representative Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) and Representative Rob Wittman (R-Va.) introduced a bill to\u00a0maintain 31 large ships. In late July 2022, Gilday released his\u00a0Navigation Plan\u00a02022\u00a0which called for 31 large amphibious ships and 18 Light Amphibious Warships.<\/p>\n Congress Is Incensed and Supports the Marines<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n By April 2022, Congress still had not received Del Toro\u2019s\u00a0Amphibious Force Requirements Study. A dispute, which became a stand-off between the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office and the Navy, caused the delay. This office wanted the Navy to reconsider portions of the report, but the Navy declined, and so the study languished. By December, Congress had had enough and passed the\u00a0National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023\u00a0with a statutory requirement for not less than\u00a031 large amphibs, including 10 \u201cbig deck\u201d and 21 \u201csmall deck\u201d ships. This Act also required the Navy Secretary to ensure that the\u00a0Commandant\u2019s views\u00a0are given appropriate consideration before a major decision is made by an element of the Navy Department outside the Marine Corps on a matter that directly concerns amphibious force structure and capability. In addition, the Act assigned directed responsibility to the Commandant for developing the requirements relating to amphibs. Del Toro finally sent the classified\u00a0Amphibious Force Requirements Study\u00a0to Congress in late December 2022. No sooner than Congress received this study, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed a \u201credo\u201d with little Navy objection, which according to\u00a0Politico, increased the Marines\u2019 frustration.<\/p>\n Navy Secretary Announces an Amphibious Strategic Pause<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Del Toro publicly stated in February 2023 that the Navy was taking a \u201cstrategic pause\u201d from buying the \u201csmall deck\u201d ships. He explained that the Navy needed additional time to determine the mix and number of amphibs before resuming\u00a0procurement. The Secretary\u2019s announcement was somewhat disingenuous as the Secretary had already initiated a de facto strategic pause in his April 2022 submission of the\u00a0fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan\u00a0and the fiscal year 2030 budget. According to\u00a0Politico, the Marines were furious over this outcome. Gilday explained that lack of funding was the \u201cdriving issue\u201d for the decision not to fund any more of these $1.8 billion \u201csmall deck\u201d ships.<\/p>\n Congress Intervenes Again for the Marines<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n By April 2023, Del Toro\u2019s strategic pause not to buy \u201csmall deck\u201d amphibs had greatly annoyed the Senate Armed Services Committee. A month later the Committee reproached Del Toro in a\u00a0June 13th\u00a0letter\u00a0for not responding to its questions regarding the Navy\u2019s non-compliance with the statutory requirement to maintain 31 large amphibious ships. The senators saw no planning in the Navy\u2019s\u00a0fiscal year 2024 shipbuilding plan\u00a0to achieve this force-level goal. Co-signed by 14 Democratic and Republican senators,\u00a0the letter stated, \u201cThe Navy\u2019s current plan not only violates the statutory requirement, but also jeopardizes the future effectiveness of the joint force, especially as we consider national security threats in the Indo-Pacific.\u201d The letter continued that the Del Toro had until June 19th\u00a0to respond with an updated shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2024, and a pointed reminder that the 31-ship requirement \u201cis not a suggestion but a requirement based on the assessed needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps.\u201d In early August\u00a0USNI News\u00a0reported that the strategic pause was still in effect. At her September 2023 confirmation hearings to become the 33rd\u00a0Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti endorsed the Marines\u2019 requirement for\u00a031 large amphibious ships.<\/p>\n Congress Helps Thwart an \u201cExistential Threat\u201d from the Navy Secretary<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n As the Marines entered 2024, the debate over the number of large amphibious ships remained unresolved. Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, called the amphib shortage the Marines\u2019 \u201csingle biggest existential threat.\u201d In March, the Defense and Navy Departments eliminated this threat by ending the two-year \u201cstrategic pause\u201d for procuring \u201csmall deck\u201d amphibs. The Navy\u2019s budget submission for fiscal year 2025 and its\u00a0fiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan, both approved by the Defense and Navy Departments, included the procurement of \u201csmall deck\u201d ships. In addition, these documents commenced the procurement of a new class of\u00a0Medium Landing Ships. The Biden Administration had caved to Congress and ended the almost two-year strategic pause.<\/p>\n Issue #2: The Unaffordable and Unsurvivable Ship<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Marines Give The Navy A Shipbuilding Bill<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Berger\u2019s guidance called for a new class of Navy amphibious ships that were\u00a0\u201csmaller, more lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms\u201d\u00a0to shuttle Marines around archipelagic islands. The Marines would \u201cshoot\u201d anti-ship cruise missiles from one island and then \u201cscoot\u201d to another island using the new amphibs as \u201cwater taxis\u201d to \u201cshoot\u201d once more. In 2020 the Navy designated this new amphib as the Light Amphibious Warship. The Navy anticipated procuring a class of 28 to 30 ships with a crew of \u201cno more than 40 Navy Sailors\u201d at a \u201cunit procurement cost of\u00a0less than $100 million.\u201d<\/p>\n Almost immediately the Navy and the Marine Corps clashed over the ship\u2019s capabilities and costs. The Navy wanted a \u201csurvivable ship,\u201d while the Marines wanted an\u00a0operational ship as fast as possible, as well as one built to civilian standards and not military standards to reduce construction costs. Their\u00a0disagreement\u00a0delayed the delivery of first ship to \u201cfiscal year 2023 and then to fiscal year 2025.\u201d By January 2024, the Navy released its request for proposals for the first six of these new class of ships for\u00a0delivery in 2029. The\u00a0Navy asked for a ship\u00a0that could lift 75 Marines and 600 tons of equipment with a \u201ccargo area of about 8,000 square feet, a helicopter pad, a 70-person crew, spots for six .50-caliber guns and two 30mm guns.\u201d The Navy also wanted the ship to be under 400 feet long, a draft of no more than 12 feet, a 14-knot endurance speed, and roll on\/roll off\u00a0beaching capability.<\/p>\n By April 2024, the Navy had re-designated the ship as a\u00a0Medium Landing Ship\u00a0with an increased estimated unit procurement cost of roughly $150 million in constant fiscal year 2024 dollars for the\u00a0first 8 ships\u00a0and a class size of 35 ships\u00a0by 2043. The Navy estimated that 55 of these ships would \u201ccost less than $200 million per ship,\u00a0on average.\u201d The Congressional Budget Office, however, projected the average cost at\u00a0$350 million per ship.<\/p>\n In December 2024, the Navy received industries\u2019 responses to its January 2024 request for proposals. After seeing the costs, the Navy immediately canceled\u00a0its request. Gobsmacked, Nickolas Guertin, the assistant secretary of the navy for research, development and acquisition, stated the request for bids, \u201ccame back with a much higher price tag. \u2026 we had to pull that solicitation back and\u00a0drop back and punt.\u201d In January 2025, the Navy punted and began looking for\u00a0\u201cexisting, private-sector designs\u201d\u00a0requiring minor modifications for conversion at a small cost.<\/p>\n In 2025, Unanswered Questions Remain About the New Amphibious Ship<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The central issue about the procurement of the Medium Landing Ship remains its construction cost, which is dependent on whether the Navy builds the ship to commercial or naval warfare standards, which is, in turn, dependent on the ship\u2019s final operational concept. Building to commercial standards lowers\u00a0construction costs. The operational concept remains unclear whether these ships will operate in a benign environment. Will they only operate in the pre-crisis phase or after hostilities have commenced and these ships find themselves in contested waters? Moreover, if the Marines intend to resupply its forces as well to relocate them during the conflict, it is highly likely that these ships would be vulnerable to detection and attack.<\/p>\n Consequently, the Navy will have a mission requirement to protect and sustain the Marines operating as stand-in forces, placing another demand on the Navy to provide forces while also conducting other high priority missions\u00a0(see Table 1).\u00a0In April 2024 the Congressional Budget Office\u00a0reported that \u201cA ship that is not expected to face enemy fire in a conflict could be built to a lesser survivability standard, with fewer defensive systems than a ship that would sail in contested waters\u00a0during a conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n Perhaps in an attempt to strengthen the argument that the Navy should construct these ships to commercial standards, the\u00a0fiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan\u00a0did not classify the Medium Landing Ship as an \u201camphibious warfare ship.\u201d Instead, in a puzzling decision it was categorized as a \u201ccommand and support\u201d vessel, despite its requirement to land Marines on beaches to conduct kinetic operations.<\/p>\n The Navy and Marine Corps Have Different Priorities and Agendas<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The Navy and the Marine Corps co-exist on some important core common tasks and viewpoints, reinforced by established historical, political, legal, and bureaucratic frameworks. The Marine focus on forward presence, forcible entry, and expeditionary warfare employing the Navy\u2019s amphibs. Whereas for the Navy, expeditionary warfare is merely one among many Navy warfare functions to include anti-air warfare, anti-surface ship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, strike warfare, special operations warfare, mine and countermine warfare, electronic and information warfare, strategic deterrence, combat logistics, and sealift for Joint Force logistic sustainment.<\/p>\n For the Marines, amphibs are a priority. For the Navy, however, ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, small surface combatants, auxiliary ships, logistics ships, oilers, and minesweepers are all priorities as well as amphibs (see Table 2).\u00a0<\/p>\n The Navy does not get to focus on just one type of ship and it is responsible for a wide range of warfighting functions. In contrast, the Marine Corps has a much narrower set of responsibilities. When force structure priorities differ between the Navy and Marines, the Navy finds itself in an awkward position between one side\u2014composed of the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Navy\u2014and the other side comprised of the Marines and Congress. Such triangulation can lead to an almost unmanageable situation whereby the Navy loses control of the planning for its future, which actually occurred\u00a0in 2019.\u00a0<\/p>\n Gilday noted that the Navy \u201cmust prioritize programs most relevant\u201d to a conflict with China. What can be more relevant to a conflict with China than logistics, especially with a U.S. Navy conducting\u00a0distributed operations, likely without the availability of Guam. Lines of communication will stretch for thousands of miles from the U.S. homeland to the operating areas. These sea lines of communication, as well as U.S. ports, will require protection because China has the means and the will to interdict and sever these lines to isolate U.S. fighting forces and prevent their sustainment. Logistics ships to sustain combat operations, submarine tenders to\u00a0rearm submarines, and oilers\u00a0to refuel the Navy\u2019s distributed forces across the vast Pacific distances may be more needed by the Navy than a new class of 35 amphibs. In February 2024 Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Jr., then the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stated that the Navy\u2019s Combat Logistics Force, which supports and sustains the Navy\u2019s distributed maritime operations with\u00a0\u201cbeans, bullets, and black oil\u201d\u00a0is operating on\u00a0\u201cnarrow margins\u201d\u00a0with insufficient ships for a war with China. He specifically cited inadequate numbers of oilers. Admiral Paparo also noted that the Chinese consider the U.S. Navy\u2019s logistics capabilities a critical vulnerability with his statement that \u201cWhen we run [war]games, the red team goes for the Combat Logistics Force every single time.\u201d The Navy\u2019s lack of strategic guidance hindered a comprehensive understanding of this and other thorny force planning issues, consequently strategic force priorities were often set on the fly.<\/p>\n The differences between the two sea services are real, and relations about Department of the Navy funding priorities have often been fractious and kept in-house. A major exception underscoring this sometime discordant relationship occurred in December 1995. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (retired), who served as Commandant,\u00a0fired a salvo at the Navy\u00a0for allegedly short-changing the Marine Corps for its fair share of the Navy Department\u2019s budget. Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, U.S. Navy (retired), Chief of Naval Operations (1990-1994), reminded Mundy that the Marines cannot ignore the \u201ctotal requirements of the Navy\u201d beside supporting the Marines in the \u201clittorals.\u201d<\/p>\n Conclusion<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n When the Marines believe their future is in jeopardy, which certainly was the case with this confrontation over 31 large amphibs and the fight for 35 new smaller amphibs, the Marines do not hesitate to seek Congress\u2019 intervention on their behalf. Besides calling the reduction in large amphibs an existential threat to the Marines\u2019 existence,\u00a0General Heckl\u00a0thundered, \u201cOur identity is elemental to who we are as Marines. We are soldiers of the sea. We are the nation\u2019s naval expeditionary force.\u00a0And we just can\u2019t lose that.\u201d His statements reflected the Marine Corps\u2019 laser focus on its own force structure, rather an appreciation of the bigger picture.<\/p>\n Advocates for any of the services can sometimes believe so passionately in the potential effectiveness of their particular service with its \u201cunique\u201d weapon systems, ships, or aircraft that \u201cthey find it difficult to appreciate the fuller pattern of a future war and the unforgiving priorities\u00a0dictating resource allocation.\u201d Their degree of identification with their service may \u201cdiscourage viewpoints and thinking oriented toward the best interests\u201d of the\u00a0Joint Force as a whole.\u201d\u00a0The Marines\u2019 success in setting the goal of 31 large amphibs and a new class of amphibs illustrates the powerful influence the Marines can and will exert over the Navy\u2019s force planning process to achieve their objectives. The nation can only hope that the recent outcomes in amphib numbers that the Marines have achieved in coordination and cooperation with congressional and industrial influence will produce the desired benefit to America\u2019s national defense, and not shortchange other high-priority requirements.<\/p>\n The Marine Corps has a well-deserved special place in the hearts of Congress and the American people\u2014a sentiment that can defy the logic of Navy force planning, and the intentions of any administration to prioritize the nation\u2019s defense requirements.\u00a0The Marines\u2014thanks to Congress\u2014have a big vote in Navy force planning.\u00a0Short of the Marine Corps becoming an independent armed service outside the Department of the Navy, the Navy, as best as it can, just has to live with a pertinacious Marine Corps \u2014 or it can borrow a page from the Marine Corps\u2019 playbook.\u00a0<\/p>\n Prior to his full retirement as a member of the U.S. senior executive service, Bruce\u00a0Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022.\u00a0He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the OPNAV N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career U.S. Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the Assistant Commandant for Capability (current title) in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive. The author drew upon his forthcoming publication,\u00a0Cold Iron: The Demise of Navy Strategy Development and Force Planning, to compose portions of this commentary.<\/em><\/p>\n This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here<\/a>.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \t
\n\u2014Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl, USMC\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n
\n\u2014Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, USN (retired)<\/em><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cimsec.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Screen-Shot-2025-03-02-at-2.01.03-PM.png?ssl=1\")
Table 1: A comparison of potential missions for the Department of the Navy during a conflict over Taiwan, divided into missions shared by the Navy and Marine Corps and missions that would be assigned to predominantly Navy forces. (Author graphic)<\/em><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cimsec.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Screen-Shot-2025-03-02-at-1.59.54-PM.png?ssl=1\")
Table 2: A comparison of ship acquisition priorities between the Navy and Marine Corps. (Author graphic)<\/em><\/p>\n
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