![\"ATSB](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.marineinsight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Stranded-Bulk-Carrier-300x157.png?resize=300%2C157&ssl=1\")
<\/div>\n![\"Stranded](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.marineinsight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Stranded-Bulk-Carrier.png?resize=1200%2C628\")
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has issued formal recommendations to three government agencies and a salvage operator with the release of its final report into the near stranding of the bulk carrier Portland Bay near Sydney in July 2022.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe stranding on pristine national park coastline of a 170-metre ship carrying 950 tonnes of heavy fuel oil would have had internationally significant environmental and economic consequences, and as such this was one of the ATSB\u2019s most comprehensive marine occurrence investigations in nearly two decades,\u201d ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
Portland Bay had been berthed at Port Kembla on 3 July 2022 when deteriorating adverse weather made it unsafe for it to remain in port, and the harbourmaster and ship\u2019s master decided that the ship should sail and remain at sea until the weather improved.<\/p>\n
After leaving Port Kembla, the ATSB\u2019s 160-page final report notes that Portland Bay remained much closer to the coast than the 50 nautical miles prescribed by the ship\u2019s procedures.<\/p>\n
Early in the morning of 4 July, while drifting and slowly steaming just 12 miles from the coast, the ship\u2019s main engine developed mechanical problems.<\/p>\n
\u201cThis loss of propulsive power in prevailing gale force winds, very rough seas and a heavy swell, effectively disabled Portland Bay, and the ship began to drift toward the rocky coast,\u201d Mr Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
\u201cDelays with the ship\u2019s master initially reporting the incident were then compounded when NSW authorities did not immediately pass on the information to the national response authority, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.<\/p>\n
\u201cIt was only after several emergency broadcasts and a radio plea for assistance that a harbour tug was dispatched, which arrived nearly five hours after the ship was first disabled.\u201d<\/p>\n
By the time that tug, which did not have an operational towing winch or a suitable towline, arrived, Portland Bay\u2019s master had made emergency use of both anchors one mile off the rocky shoreline of Royal National Park.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe ship\u2019s anchors, while not designed to hold the ship in these severe conditions, prevented a catastrophic stranding on the rocky shore,\u201d Mr Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
Fortunately, the anchors reduced the ship\u2019s progress towards the coast until two more harbour tugs arrived, about five hours after it was anchored.<\/p>\n
In the following hours, these two tugs began towing the ship away from the coast, but some time later, the towline of one of the tugs failed and Portland Bay again began drifting towards the shore, now off Cronulla.<\/p>\n
The ship\u2019s master was forced for a second time to deploy both anchors.<\/p>\n
\u201cEven with both anchors deployed and one tug connected, the ship did not hold its position and it continued to slowly move towards the coastline overnight,\u201d Mr Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
The ATSB\u2019s investigation found a key factor in the prolonged exposure of the ship and its crew to stranding, was the extensive delay in tasking the state\u2019s nominated ocean-going emergency towage vessel, Svitzer Glenrock.<\/p>\n
The Port Authority of NSW had assumed control to lead the response, with AMSA and NSW Maritime as support agencies.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe initial request to AMSA for Svitzer Glenrock to be activated was made around midday on the first day by the Port Authority,\u201d Mr Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
\u201cHowever, this first request was lost between the two agencies\u2019 incident control rooms and was not followed up for many hours.\u201d<\/p>\n
It was not until after the towing attempt had failed and a further two requests were made that AMSA tasked Svitzer Glenrock, almost 13 hours after the emergency began.<\/p>\n
\u201cAround 30 hours after Portland Bay\u2019s master had reported its disablement followed by MAYDAY broadcasts and the emergency anchoring, Svitzer Glenrock arrived after a voyage of 90 nautical miles from Newcastle in very rough weather,\u201d Mr Mitchell noted.<\/p>\n
\u201cOn the following day, more than 48 hours after the emergency developed, the ship was towed into Port Botany for refuge and repairs by the ETV with harbour tugs.\u201d<\/p>\n
The ATSB\u2019s investigation identified 8 safety issues associated with the emergency response, highlighting confusion and inefficient coordination between the multiple agencies involved.<\/p>\n
\u201cThree legislated bodies had a defined role within relevant legislation and state and national plans to respond to this emergency, but each agency did not believe that the response necessarily fell within their responsibility, and they have since justified this belief through three differing interpretations of the same plans,\u201d Mr Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
\u201cThese differing understandings of responsibilities effectively left a significant proportion of the emergency response in the hands of commercial arrangements \u2013 arrangements that had inherent limitations, most notably an immediate lack of available and suitable assets for the required task.\u201d<\/p>\n
The report notes the NSW and Australian national plan for managing maritime emergencies are designed to provide the best available actions in managing risks along Australia\u2019s extensive and pristine coastline.<\/p>\n
\u201cAMSA and the Port Authority of NSW had not effectively implemented their respective procedures to comply with these plans, and NSW Maritime, the statutory agency responsible for ensuring the state was prepared to respond to this type of incident, had not effectively met this obligation,\u201d Mr Mitchell said.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe National Plan reiterates the principle of \u2018over-escalation\u2019 in an initial response, on the basis that it is more effective to scale down, than up,\u201d he continued.<\/p>\n
\u201cWhile the first responding tug crew have been praised for their efforts in what were very challenging weather and operational conditions, the three harbour tugs that were initially deployed to manage this emergency were not properly equipped, and ultimately were always going to be incapable of effectively towing the ship in the rough, open seas even though at 15,500 tonnes, it was less than half the weight had it been fully laden with cargo.<\/p>\n
\u201cIt was only the emergency deployment of both anchors on two separate occasions that very fortunately prevented Portland Bay from stranding in pounding seas, before the only capable ocean-going ETV in NSW arrived after an extended, unnecessary delay.\u201d<\/p>\n